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This paper proposes a methodology to analyze the implications of the Advanced Measurement 
Approach (AMA) for the assessment of operational risk put forward by the Basel II Accord. The 
methodology relies on an integrated procedure for the construction of the distribution of aggregate 
losses, using internal and external loss data. It is illustrated on a 2x2 matrix of two selected 
business lines and two event types, drawn from a database of 3000 losses obtained from a large 
European banking institution. For each cell, the method calibrates three truncated distributions 
functions for the body of internal data, the tail of internal data, and external data. When the 
dependence structure between aggregate losses and the non-linear adjustment of external data are 
explicitly taken into account, the regulatory capital computed with the AMA method proves to be 
substantially lower than with less sophisticated approaches allowed by the Basel II Accord, although 
the effect is not uniform for all business lines and event types. In a second phase, our models are 
used to estimate the effects of operational risk management actions on bank profitability, through a 
measure of RAROC adapted to operational risk. The results suggest that substantial savings can be 
achieved through active management techniques, although the estimated effect of a reduction of 
the number, frequency or severity of operational losses crucially depends on the calibration of the 
aggregate loss distributions. 
 
JEL-code:   C24, G18, G21 
Keywords:  Operational Risk Management, Basel II, Advanced Measurement Approach, 
Copulae, External Data, EVT, RAROC, Cos-benefit Analysis. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the first Basel Accord was adopted in 1978, the banking sector has been persistently 
complaining about the simplistic approach of risk-adjusted credit exposures based on the adoption of 
the Cooke ratio for the determination of economic capital. The arbitrary categorization of securities in 
broad risk classes was allegedly leading to overly conservative and/or inadequate capital charges. 
Therefore, many large institutions have developed their own proprietary model for credit and market 
risk exposure with the objective of convincing their corresponding regulator of the superiority of their 
"Internal Rating Based" approach over the Basel I standards. The need for organizing the framework 
under which the IRB approach is eligible to measure banks' exposures to credit risk is probably the 
main impetus for the revision of this system through the second Accord. 
 
Yet, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter the Basel Committee) has also taken this 
opportunity to extend the scope of its proposals well beyond this emblematic issue. In particular, the 
new Accord introduces and thoroughly examines a type of risk which, although well documented in 
the manufacturing sector, had been somewhat overlooked by the banking industry until recently: that 
is, operational risk, defined by the New Accord on Capital Adequacy proposal (hereafter Basel II) as 
the “risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems or from 
external events” (BCBS, 2003a).  
 
This new focus of the Regulatory Authorities on operational risks has indeed had a tremendous impact 
on the banking sector. Unlike credit and market risks, whose awareness within the banking industry 
roots back very far in the past and whose importance had already been recognized by the Basel I 
Accord, operational risk in the financial sector is a fairly new concept and thus in need for precise 
modeling and measurement methodologies. Indeed, except for fraud, most banks had in the past a 
tendency to neglect this heterogeneous family of risks that were perceived as too diffuse and 
peripheral. For the same reasons, until recently, few banks had set up a systematic collection of data 
relative to operational losses. 
 
Basel II leaves to banks the choice between three approaches for quantifying the regulatory capital for 
operational risk. First, the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) defines the operational risk capital as a 
fraction (15%) of the gross income of the institution, thus explicitly assuming that operational risk is 
related to size. Gross income is the sum of the interest margin, the fee income, and the other revenues. 
However, internationally active banks are strongly recommended not to adopt this simple model. 
Second, the Standardized Approach (SA) slightly refines the BIA, as it calculates the operational risk 
capital on the basis of gross income split per business. Here, the regulator distinguishes among   2 
different operational risk levels according to the type of activity performed. The fraction of the gross 
income for capital assessment varies from 12% for the least risky business lines (i.e., retail banking, 
asset management) to 18% for the most risky ones (i.e. trading and settlement), with an intermediate 
level at 15% of the gross income for other categories (corporate banking for instance). Finally, under 
the  Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), banks are free to develop their own model for 
assessing the regulatory capital that covers their operational risk, with a confidence interval of 99.9%. 
International banks are advised by the regulator to comply with the AMA, and to quickly adapt their 
quantitative data collection, theoretical modeling of risk exposure and statistical validation in order to 
be allowed to make use of a proprietary model. The choice faced by banks among several methods, 
although similar to the choice for credit risk modeling, is more critical in this case, as the cost-benefit 
trade-off of the alternative is completely unknown.   
 
Our paper examines two key issues faced by banks in handling operational risks: the cost-benefit 
analysis of engaging in the AMA instead of the basic approach, and the incremental cost-benefit 
analysis of striving towards an efficient operational risk management system. These two levels of 
analysis involve a study in two stages, with a focus on the necessary trade-off between the accuracy of 
the modeling approach (in order to fit actual data) on the one hand, and the relative parametric 
simplicity of the framework (in order to conserve the possibility to perform sensitivity analyses) on the 
other hand.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section offers an overview of the literature. In Section 
3, we discuss the modeling choices underlying the measurement of operational risk capital. Section 4 
describes the database that we used in our analysis. The fifth section tests the risk measurement 
methodology on real data. Section 6 reviews the best practices in operational risk management and 
links them to the quantitative methodology. Section 7 assesses the impact of operational risk 
management for a bank. Finally, Section 8 presents our concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
As the concern about operational risk is rather new in the banking area, the literature on this topic, 
both by scientific researchers and practitioners, is currently booming, mostly on quantitative 
methodologies and tools than can be applied to this issue.  
 
The Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) proposed by the Basel II Accord encompasses all 
measurement techniques that lead to a precise measurement of the exposure of each business line of a 
financial institution to each category of operational loss events. Although AMA is in principle open to   3 
any proprietary model, the most popular AMA methodology is by far the Loss Distribution Approach 
(or LDA).  
 
The LDA approach is an application of actuarial methods that combine a frequency distribution 
describing the occurrence of operational losses in the organization and a severity distribution that 
describes the economic impact of the individual losses (see e.g. Frachot et al., 2001, or Cruz, 2002, for 
theoretical backgrounds and Bank of America, 2003, or ITWGOR, 2003, for practitioners’ points of 
view). Although it does not specifically consider the tail of the aggregate loss distribution, its modular 
structure opens the possibility to deal separately with the extreme losses, using instruments from 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to model the tail of the distribution (Embrechts et al., 1997). Still, 
estimating high quantiles of the distribution remains a difficult problem, since the structure of 
operational risk data is barely consistent with standard modeling assumptions (Embrechts et al., 2003). 
This is mostly because internally generated databases are not likely to include sufficient data to merely 
rely on the observation of extreme losses for the calibration of the tails of distribution. 
 
Using external loss data to model extreme losses raises a number of methodological questions, as 
observed by several authors (Frachot and Roncalli, 2002; Baud et al., 2002). The main issue is to 
identify the type of data to consider, since the processes having generated those external losses might 
be very different from one banking institution to another. Another question relates to the appropriate 
scaling of the external data in order to adjust for the size of the bank including them in its model (Shih 
et al., 2000, or Hartung, 2003). 
 
After modeling the loss distribution for one type of event in one business line of activities, the 
approach has to be extended to several business lines of activities, and several types of operational 
events. While, by  default,  Basel assumes full positive correlation between these risks, banks are 
nevertheless offered the possibility to estimate the correlation between risk events by appropriate 
techniques for dependence characterization, such as copulae. Once again, applications to operational 
risk are scarce; in risk management, this approach has been used so far for measurement of 
dependence in insurance (Klugman and Parsa, 1999), market risk (Mashal and Zeevi, 2002) or credit 
risk (Frey et al., 2001).  
 
In this paper, we develop an integrated LDA methodology and we apply it to real internal operational 
loss data from a European banking institution. To our knowledge, this is the only application in the 
current literature that uses a full LDA approach with real life data. Most other papers usually 
concentrate on technical aspects and illustrate them with simulated data. The study most closely 
related to ours in this respect is Fontnouvelle  et al. (2003), which uses public operational loss 
databases to show that the charge for operational risk often exceeds the charge for market risk,   4 
although the amount of regulatory capital may vary with the size and scope of a bank’s activities. 
However, the study by Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) is based on an external database that is publicly 
available, not exhaustive and restricted to large losses.   
 
Next to the numerous contributions on modeling, a few publications address specific issues relating to 
operational risk management. The Basel Committee (BCBS, 2003b) defined sound practices for the 
management of operational risks. Jorion (2003) summarizes some of the bank practices and 
recommendations previously mentioned in BIS publications.  Hoffman (2002) presents the best 
practices in operational risk management for 20 large companies. Crouhy et al. (2001) and Alexander 
(2003) propose synthetic classifications of the different dimensions of operational risk management.  
 




In the Basel II Accord, three approaches are thus proposed to compute the capital requirements for 
operational risk in banks. When they opt for the AMA, banks are allowed to develop in-house 
measurement techniques provided they fulfill qualitative and quantitative requirements. In particular, a 
soundness standard similar to the standard adopted for credit risk is mandatory. This standard is set to 
a confidence level of 99.9% for a one-year holding period. Clearly, accurate modeling of the extreme 
right part of the loss distribution is of crucial importance when computing an Operational Value-at-
Risk (henceforth OpVaR) at such a high level of confidence. 
 
Among eligible AMA techniques, we specifically use the Loss Distribution Approach (or LDA). This 
parametric technique consists in separately estimating the frequency and severity distributions of 
losses, then computing the aggregated loss distribution through convolution. It is usually impossible to 
derive analytical expressions for this kind of convolutions; hence, numerical methods such as Monte 
Carlo simulations are used in practice. As a consequence, a precise overall characterization of the 
entire severity distribution, including its body, is required.  
 
Thus, the analyst faces the need of fitting both the body and the tail of the distribution very well to get 
accurate figures. A single functional form for the severity distribution lacks the necessary flexibility to 
correctly deal with both the body and the tail. Moreover, goodness-of-fit tests such as the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic will often select distributions that do a good job in fitting the body of 
the distribution, while under-weighting the extreme parts of the tail. A solution could be to modify   5 
these tests by incorporating weights for the different parts of the distribution so that the extreme 
quantiles are adequately accounted for.  
 
In our preliminary tests, however, we have repeatedly found that classical probability distributions are 
unable to model the entire range of losses in a satisfactory way (i.e., they yield a poor fit). Therefore, 
we propose to consider a conceptually different approach whereby the operational losses of a bank are 
viewed as arising from two different generating processes, so that "normal" (i.e. high frequency/low 
impact) losses do not stem from the same distribution as the "extreme" (i.e. low frequency/high 
impact) losses. As a consequence we define the severity distribution as a mixture of two distributions: 
the "normal" distribution and the "extreme" distribution. For simplicity, we will assume that these 
distributions are mutually exclusive; that is, the "normal" distribution includes all losses in a limited 
range denoted [ L;H],  L being the "collection” threshold used by the bank,  while the "extreme" 
distribution generates all the losses above H.
1 Thus H is the “cut-off” threshold separating "normal" 
and "extreme" losses, as can be seen on Figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 approximately here 
 
This idea of dealing separately with “normal” a nd “extreme” losses has been examined  in the 
operational risk context by several authors (see, among others, King, 2001, and Alexander, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the determination of the most appropriate threshold for separating the distributions of 
normal and extreme losses is still heuristic, and is typically based on a graphical analysis.
2 With this 
respect, in order to achieve a fully consistent algorithmic procedure, we provide support for a different 
treatment of the “extreme” losses and a more rigorous way to detect the “cut-off” threshold.  
 
3.2. Models for the distribution of losses: Internal data 
 
3.2.1. Frequency of losses 
 
The issue of calibrating a probability density function for the number of losses within a given time 
interval, i.e. the frequency of losses, is classical in risk management. For short periods of time, the 
choice between the homogenous Poisson distribution and the negative binomial distribution is 
important, as the intensity parameter is deterministic in the first case and stochastic in the second (see 
Embrechts et al., 2003 for a discussion). However, as the prudential requirement for the computation 
of economic capital involves measuring the 99.9% OpVaR on a yearly period, this issue appears to be 
                                                        
1 The "no overlap" assumption can arguably be questioned. However, the approach described here could easily be extended 
to an "overlap" situation. This extension is left for further research. 
2 The approach advocated by Dupuis (1998) is an exception.   6 
marginally relevant: using simulations, numerical evidence has shown us that the mere calibration of a 
Poisson distribution with constant parameter l corresponding to the average number of observed 
losses during a full year provides a very good approximation of the true frequency distribution. 
Therefore, we choose not to focus on this particular issue in the rest of the paper. 
 
3.2.2. “Normal” losses (severity distribution) 
 
The “normal” losses are generally well represented in the collected samples and their severity can thus 
quite easily be modeled with a traditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The severity 
distribution can be fitted with well-known heavy-tailed distributions such as the Exponential, the 
Weibull, the Gamma or the Lognormal. Functional forms of these distributions a re given in the 
Appendix 1. 
 
As a preliminary step to measure operational risk, it is necessary to take the “collection” threshold into 
account when estimating the parameters of the distribution. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 1, we 
also have to introduce the existence of an upper bound (the “cut-off” threshold) in the calculations. 
Thus, letting q be the parameters vector, the “true” probability density function of the loss variable x 
(denoted f(x;q)) is transformed as follows in order to obtain the density function f* of the losses in 
[L;H] : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
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=           (1) 
where  F denotes the cumulative density function, L the collection threshold and H the “cut-off” 
threshold. 
 
Thus f*(x;q) is the function of interest when estimating the parameters. We use a simple Maximum 
Likelihood approach to estimate the distribution’s parameters. As it is more convenient to optimize the 
logarithmic transformation of this function, the log-likelihood function to be maximized is  
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3.2.3. “Cut-off” threshold 
 
To identify a threshold separating "normal" from "extreme" losses, some authors simply select an 
arbitrary measure such as the 90
th percentile of the sample, or rely on graphical tools such as the 
popular Mean Excess Plot (see Embrechts et al., 1997, for details).  
 
Although the graphical approach is currently the most widely used, Dupuis (1998) describes a 
parametric method to perform the threshold selection. In a related research (Peters et al., 2004), we 
propose an algorithmic alternative, which compares several thresholds and selects the best one based 
on an objective measure, namely a “goodness-of-fit” statistic on the upper part of the sample. 
However, since this issue is peripheral to the current research, we do not develop the full-fledged 
methodology here and directly report the main results of the algorithm.   
 
3.2.4. “Extreme” losses (severity distribution) 
 
Lack of data, resulting in small-sized samples, represents a common issue when dealing with 
operational losses in banks. Moreover, because of the limited collection period available nowadays 
(often less than 3 years), databases typically do not include very rare, but yet very severe losses. 
Therefore, estimating the distribution of "extreme" losses by classical maximum likelihood methods 
may yield distributions that are not sufficiently heavy-tailed to reflect the probability of occurrence of 
such exceptional losses. To resolve this issue, we rely on concepts and methods from Extreme Value 
Theory (EVT), and more specifically on the Peak Over Threshold (POT) approach. 
 
This approach first requires to determine a high threshold and then to estimate the parameters of an 
extreme distribution using all the observations above this threshold. This procedure builds upon a 
classical theorem of Pickands (1975) and Balkema and de Haan (1974) which essentially states that, 
for a broad class of distributions, the values of the variables above a sufficiently high threshold follow 
the same distribution, namely the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD).
3  
 
In the literature, EVT is often used to estimate very high quantiles, for instance to compute Value-at-
Risk figures (see McNeil, 2000, or Këllezi and Gilli, 2003). But estimating an extreme quantile of a 
distribution is very different from obtaining the whole PDF of the losses, which is nevertheless needed 
in order to compute the convolution of the severity distribution with itself (this is how we get the 
aggregated loss distribution). In addition, the global shape of this distribution is also important when 
dealing with dependence measurement techniques. 
 
                                                        
3 The complete form of the GPD is given in Appendix 1.   8 
In our implementation, we simultaneously assess the distribution of normal losses and select the cut-
off threshold. To do so, we consider m different levels for the “cut-off” threshold Hi , i =1,…,m and we 
estimate the parameters vector q  of the GPD associated with each level (i.e. based on the excesses 
over Hi). Then, we compare the m selected combinations (one for each value of H) and we select the 
optimal “cut-off” threshold based on a mix of goodness-of-fit statistic (Cramer-von Mises), visual 
inspection of the Mean Excess Plot and expert judgment. 
 
3.2.5. Mitigating risk through insurance 
 
Under the Basel II recommendations, banks adopting the advanced approaches are authorized to 
account for the risk mitigating impact of insurance in their capital charge computations, provided the 
implied capital reduction is less than 20%.  
 
Concretely speaking, if an insurance policy covers the losses between the amounts A and B, all the 
simulated losses that fall between these two bounds and that satisfy the conditions included in the 
policy are fixed to 0 (or any other minimum amount specified in the contract).  
 
In our case, such a policy does exist by our data provider so that we have accounted for it in all 
computations. 
 
3.3. The aggregate loss distribution per business line and per event type  
 
Once the overall form of the severity distribution has been derived, we combine it with the frequency 
distribution to get the aggregated loss distribution, which is the relevant distribution when it comes to 
compute the required economic capital.  
 
This aggregated distribution is obtained by n-fold convolution of the severity distribution with itself, 
where n is the Poisson frequency variable. We compute this convolution by Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
3.4. Models for the distribution of losses: External data 
 
In order to fully comply with the Basel Accord, the Advanced Measurement Approach ought to 
specify a proper way to complete the sample of extreme losses using external loss data.  
   9 
There are several ways to integrate internal and external data:  
-  Separate estimation of two distributions, respectively based on internal and external data, and 
combination of both distributions by Bayesian techniques (see for instance Chapter 7 in 
Alexander, 2003).  
-  Creation of an enlarged sample of observations containing a mix of internal and external data 
(Frachot et al., 2002).  
-  Improvement of the accuracy of the tail of the severity distribution, based on the information 
contained in the external dataset. Relying on external data provides indeed another way of 
accounting for events that have never been observed at the financial institution under consideration 
but that could occur in the future, and is similar in spirit to Extreme Value Theory approaches. 
 
To avoid a bias toward overestimation, the first two methods require the external dataset to have a 
collection threshold that is not too high when compared with the internal one. Loss data collected by 
pooling consortia such as ORX or the Italian initiative DIPO are thus well suited for these methods. 
On the other hand, data found in commercial loss databases such as OpVantage’s “First” usually have 
a high threshold ($1 million for First), so that they are more appropriate for the third approach. We 
have adopted the latter approach in our study. 
 
Whatever the motivation for considering external data, pooling internal and external observations 
presents several statistical challenges. In particular, external data must be scaled appropriately to be 
comparable with internal data, and the threshold of collection of extreme losses is often not known 
precisely for external data. To date, few researchers have addressed these issues explicitly (see Baud et 
al., 2002, Frachot and Roncalli, 2002, or Shih et al., 2000).  
 
A direct scaling method for external data consists in linearly adjusting the losses based on a given 
exogenous measure, such as gross income. While  easy to implement, such a method is not very 
appealing, as the heterogeneous nature of operational risks suggests that the magnitude of each type of 
operational losses has no simple linear relationship with gross income. 
 
Another methodology is thus to use a non-linear relationship between losses and gross income, 
similarly to Shih et al. (2000) or Hartung (2003). A potential drawback of these approaches is that the 
collection threshold of the external database is not unique, as it has to be adjusted for each event. The 
threshold should therefore be considered as a stochastic variable to be estimated (see Baud et al., 
2002, for details), unless one uses the external database for the sole purpose of completing the tail 
estimation of the distribution, which is the option taken in this paper. We thus follow the non-linear 
scaling approach of Shih et al. (2000) to model the tail of the severity distribution and consider the 
following relationship between firm size and loss magnitude:   10 
 
) (q = F a R Loss             (3) 
 
where Loss is the loss magnitude, R is a proxy for the firm size (the gross income for instance), a is a 
scaling factor (when a = 1, we have the simple linear relationship) and q is the vector of all the risk 
factors not explained by  R, so that F(q) is the multiplicative residual term not explained by any 
fluctuations in size. 
 
Taking the logarithm and dividing both sides of (3) by ln(R), we obtain the following relationship: 
y = a + b x + e             (4) 
with y = ln(Loss) / ln(R) and x = 1 / ln(R).
4 
 
Once a is estimated (through a simple regression approach with Ordinary Least Squares or Weighted 












         (5) 
where Rext is the gross income of the external business segment (or bank) and Rint is the gross income 
of the internal business segment (or bank). If a = 0, it means that the volume of the bank's activities 
has no relationship with the size of the losses. If a = 1, this relationship is assumed to be linear. 
 
3.5. Dealing with all business lines and event types  
 
For each entity, operational losses (frequency and severity) have to be collected for 8 business lines 
and 7 event categories. This creates a matrix with 56 cells, with various characteristics on the number 
of observations, average and dispersion of losses.  
 
The modeling approach outlined in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 can be applied to each individual cell of 
the matrix. Then, the resulting loss distributions still have to be combined in order to derive the 
multivariate distribution of operational losses for the entire matrix. This modular procedure must be 
flexible enough to account for two difficulties: 
-  Some cells may be empty or quasi-empty, which creates the need for appropriate procedure 
inferring information from more global data. Since this issue is not central in our study, we 
restrict our attention to a dataset that will enable us to disregard it altogether; see Section 4.2.  
                                                        
4 Note that b = E[ln F(q)] and  e = [ln F(q) - b] / ln(R).  11 
-  The correlation of distributions between different cells has to be modeled in a tractable but 
accurate way. This requires to estimate and to model the dependency between univariate 
distributions and to produce their joint distribution. For this purpose, we investigate the use of 
copulae specifications; see Section 5.3. 
 
 
4.  Database description  
 
4.1. Internal data 
 
The methodology has been tested on a set of real operational loss data coming from a large banking 
institution in Europe, whose collection has been made in compliance with the Basel II definition of 
business lines and event types for the adoption of the AMA.  
 
For the sake of data confidentiality, we have scaled the amounts of losses by a homothetic 
transformation, so that this does not influence the distribution and we have adjusted the time frame of 
data collection so as to obtain a total of 3,000 loss events. Therefore, though neither the number nor 
the amounts of losses could be used to assess the actual operational risk exposure of this financial 
institution, the internal database remains realistic.  
 
The summary statistics displayed in Table 1 give a general overview of the amount, the nature and the 
distribution of the data used in this paper. 
 
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
 
In our study, we use external data drawn from the First database commercialized by OpVantage. 
Descriptive statistics for these losses are given in Appendix 2.  
 
4.2. Selected cells of the matrix 
 
Since many cells contain a small number of data, too small indeed to apply sophisticated statistical 
techniques, and since our purpose in this study is primarily to develop and to illustrate a methodology, 
we focus our analysis on a sub-matrix consisting of 2 rows and 2 columns of the original matrix: 
(Private banking + Asset management
5 / Retail banking) · (Clients, products & business practices / 
                                                        
5 These two business lines, although distinct in the Basel II list, are merged for the sake of our VaR estimations. They indeed 
involve activities and risk exposures that are very close to each other.  12 
Execution, delivery & process management). The distribution of loss events among these cells is given 
in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
 
These cells involve enough data to enable us to perform a meaningful analysis on internal data, 
including the calibration of a proper dependence structure between business lines and event types. 
 
5.  Empirical results  
 
In this section, we first develop an internal measurement for one of the four selected cells using the 
methodology described in the previous sections. We treat internal data only in Section 5.1.1, then we 
explore the inclusion of external losses and compare the results of both methods in Section 5.1.2. 
Finally, once the approach is conducted for the four cells, we use copulae to introduce some 
dependence structure in our models. Notice that insurance policies are accounted for throughout this 
section. 
 
5.1. Measurement for a single cell 
 
5.1.1. Use of internal data only 
 
We consider the computation of the Operational Value-at-Risk (OpVaR) for the cell “Retail Banking / 
Clients, Products and Business Practices”. In order to do so, we first have to split the sample into two 
sub-samples of “normal” vs. “extreme” losses. To identify the threshold that separates the two sub-
samples, we plot the Mean Excess Function (MEF). When the graph of the MEF follows a reasonably 
straight line with positive gradient above a certain value, this indicates a heavy-tailed distribution (see 
Embrechts et al., 1997, for details). As can be seen on Figure 2, a strengthening of the positive trend 
appears around u = 700.  
 
As the Mean Excess Plot does not necessarily provide a reliable answer to the threshold detection 
problem, we complement visual inspection with a more robust algorithm (see Peters et al., 2004, for 
details). The main results are summarized in Table 3. The minimum Cramer – von Mises (CVM) 
statistic is obtained for u = 775, but since a very similar result is obtained with u = 675 (note the 
similar estimate of the tail index x), we select the latter threshold so as to increase the number of 
extreme observations available to estimate the GPD parameters.  
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Insert Figure 2 approximately here 
Insert Table 3 approximately here 
 
Next, we fit a distribution on each sub-sample by a Maximum Likelihood approach adapted to the 
truncated sub-samples. We test three distributions for the “normal” losses (Gamma, Weibull and 
lognormal
6) and we select the best one based on well-known goodness-of-fit indicators (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov, Cramer-von Mises and Anderson-Darling). The lognormal (0.86; 2.84) provides the best fit 
for this specific cell. Its quantile-quantile plot (or QQ-plot) is displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Insert Figure 3 approximately here 
 
We then estimate the parameters of the extreme GPD distribution for the losses above the threshold u 
= 675. We obtain estimates of 0.735 for the shape parameter x and 542 for the scale parameter s. 
More details about the results are reported in Table 4.   
 
Insert Table 4 approximately here 
 
Finally, we compute the OpVaR at the 99.9% confidence level with Monte Carlo simulations
7. The 
frequency of the losses is assumed to be Poisson distributed
8 and the severity distribution is a mixture 
of a lognormal (0.86; 2.84) for the losses under 675 and a GPD (0.735; 542) for the losses above this 
threshold. Basel II defines the regulatory capital charge as the Unexpected Loss (defined as the 
difference between the OpVaR99.9 and the Expected Loss) provided the bank is “able to demonstrate 
to the satisfaction of its national supervisor that it has measured and accounted for its [Expected 
Loss] exposure” (BCBS, 2003, al. 629). In our case, this amounts to 1.16 million – 0.10 million = 1.06 
million. 
 
5.1.2. Introducing external data 
 
We now introduce an additional component in our measurement f ramework, namely the external 
database. We scale the external data by the procedure of Shih et al. (2000), as described in Section 3.4. 
An ordinary least square technique yields an estimate of the scaling factor a (see Equations 3 to 5). For 
the “Retail Banking / Client, Products and Business Practices” cell, we obtain the value a = 0.152, 
which is in line with the findings in Shih et al. (2000). Such a value indicates that the relationship 
between losses and size is clearly non-linear. Then we scale the external data accordingly and estimate 
                                                        
6 These distributions are classical candidates for these kinds of applications, although other specifications could obviously be 
considered as well.  
7 We have simulated 5 sets of 10.000 years of losses and averaged the obtained quantiles. 
8 The alternative would be to use a negative binomial distribution and apply it similarly in our Monte Carlo experiments.   14 
the distribution of the resulting data. For this particular case, a lognormal distribution with parameters 
9.041 and 1.529 fits the data well.  
 
Next, we compute the aggregate loss distribution based on a severity distribution that now combines 
three elements: a distribution for the body of the data (“high frequency/low severity” events), the GPD 
distribution for high losses and the external data distribution for extremely high losses as shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
Insert Figure 4 approximately here 
 
The frequency distribution, the severity distribution and the aggregated loss distribution for this cell 
are plotted in Figure 5. 
 
Insert Figure 5 approximately here 
 
To assess the impact of the introduction of external data to the high quantiles estimates of the 
aggregate loss distribution and the regulatory capital, Table 5 provides a comparison between results 
obtained with internal data only and with the inclusion of external data. 
 
Insert Table 5 approximately here 
 
These results suggest that replacing EVT estimates of the GPD parameters by the fitted distribution of 
comparable external observations considerably concentrates the tail of the aggregate loss distribution, 
leading to a larger value of the OpVaR95 and the OpVaR99. However, the sign of the difference 
switches within the last percentile, leading to a more conservative estimate of the OpVaR99.9 when 
computed with internal data. This is due to the particular property of the GPD involved in our 
application of the Extreme Value Theory that results in a fatter behaviour of the very far end of the tail 
than if one merely fits observed values, even if they are very large, as with external data. 
 
5.2. Measurement for the complete matrix 
 
A similar methodology has been used for the other three cells. Table 6 summarizes the corresponding 
results when external data is used in the modeling of the tail.  
 
Insert Table 6 approximately here 
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If the operations of the bank were limited to these four cells, the results in Table 6 could provide the 
total required capital charge for operational risk under the assumption of perfect dependence between 
the cells of the matrix. Based on this default assumption of Basel II, we simply need to aggregate the 
OpVaR in excess of Expected Losses to get the overall capital charge. In our case, this amounts to 
7.91 millions (OpVaR99.9) – 0.86 million (Expected Loss) = 7.05 millions. A more realistic approach, 
i.e. adequately taking dependence between risks into account, is analyzed in the next section. 
 
Finally we have computed confidence intervals for the capital charge using bootstrapping techniques 
in order to test the robustness of the results. The 90%-confidence interval for the capital charge of each 
cell is reported in Table 7. 
 
Insert Table 7 approximately here 
 
Overall, our capital charge estimation for the whole four-cells bank should be within a 20% interval of 
our point estimate nine times out of ten. While this interval might seem broad, one should remember 
that we have a database of limited size. As operational losses databases increase in size, we may 
expect the accuracy of the estimates to improve and the confidence intervals to get narrower.  
 
5.3. Introduction of a dependence structure 
 
5.3.1. Dependence assumptions 
 
An important issue in o perational risk modeling is the dependence assumption. Basel II assumes 
perfect positive dependence between risks, as it proposes to compute the total capital charge by simple 
addition of the capital charge for every cell of the matrix. Thus, all the severe losses are implicitly 
assumed to take place simultaneously. This assumption is not realistic: it is legitimate to consider that 
operational risks are not fully correlated in view of their heterogeneous nature.  
 
A possible remedy is to include more appropriate dependence structures through the use of copulae. 
Copulae are the joint distribution functions of random vectors with standard uniform marginal 
distributions. They provide a way of understanding how marginal distributions of single risks are 
coupled together to form joint distributions of groups of risks. As a consequence, copulae could be an 
appealing solution to model dependence between risks. There are numerous families of copulae, each 
having its own specificities.  
 
In the literature, the most u sual way of studying dependence betweens risks is to focus on the 
frequency dependence rather than on the severity one (see Section 4.3 of Frachot et al., 2003, for a  16 
discussion of this topic). It seems indeed relevant to consider correlated occurrences of loss events, 
and this can be performed in a straightforward way. Unfortunately, this approach neglects the possible 
dependence (or absence thereof) of the magnitude of losses between event types and/or business lines.  
 
We address the dependence issue in more details below but a quick look at Table 8 gives a first 
indication about the correlations between frequencies of risks.  
 
Insert Table 8 approximately here 
 
Panel A of this Table reports the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between each of the four 
cells, while Panel B focuses on the two selected business lines and Panel C gives the correlations 
between all the business lines. In our context of strictly positive random variables following a highly 
skewed distribution, the use of a non-parametric indicator of dependence such as the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient is more appropriate than Pearson’s product-moment coefficient (see Embrechts 
et al., 2002).  
 
The relatively low values of the coefficients clearly demonstrate that a perfect positive dependence 
assumption is probably unduly strong; this suggests that taking “real” dependence structure into 
account would lead to more realistic results and, probably, lower the total required capital charge.    
 
5.3.2. Assessment of the diversification effect 
 
Within the advanced approach proposed by Basel II, banks should consider 8 business lines and 7 
event types. As a result, 56 aggregated loss distributions should be estimated and then combined to 
derive the overall aggregated loss distribution of the bank.  
 
For instance, if we want to model the dependence between these 56 cells by means of a Gaussian 
copula, a correlation matrix should be derived. As a consequence dealing with a 56x56 matrix might 
lead to computational difficulties. Therefore  some banks will limit themselves to the modeling of 
dependence between business lines. In this paper, we consider both cases, using the Gaussian copula. 
 
When modeling dependence between business lines only (in our case, that means that we are 
considering a simple bivariate case), Spearman’s r is 0.155, once again indicating a low dependence 
between the risks.  
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Table 9 summarizes the different values of the Operational Value-at-Risk and the capital charges 
reported under various dependence assumptions (see Nelsen, 1999, for a description of the 
computational methodology involved here). 
 
Insert Table 9 approximately here 
 
As can be seen in Table 9, taking the real dependence into account substantially reduces the required 
capital charge. In our case, this reduction is in the 30-35% range, which is similar to some results 
observed in the literature.
9 Reduction of the capital charge is thus potentially important when adequate 
dependence measures are introduced in the approach. 
 
There exist many different copulae and the choice of an adequate copula is not an easy task. To assess 
the impact of a given copula on the OpVaR, we have conducted another study using Frank’s copula 
(Frank, 1979). Using our data, the difference is not very significant. For instance, when only 
considering the business lines, the parameter estimate of the copula i s 0.97, which leads to an 
OpVaR99.9 of 5.41 millions (versus 5.38 million for the Gaussian copula) and only a 0.5 % increase of 





Our measurement approach includes the use of different distributions to model the body and the tail of 
the severity distribution, the use of external data to improve the modeling of the tail and the use of 
copulae to account for the real dependence structure.  
 
By taking very large losses into account (including losses that might not yet have occurred in the 
bank), Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and external data open the possibility to improve models of the 
tail of the loss distribution. This prudential approach is compliant with Basel II requirements. 
Moreover, we have shown that adequately introducing the observed dependence between risks allows 
for a significant reduction of the capital charge (about a third). 
 
Table 10 reports the capital charge obtained under various assumptions: the Basic Indicator Approach 
(BIA), the Standardized Approach (SA), and four Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) with 
different dependence assumptions (full positive dependence, dependence between business lines, 
                                                        
9 For instance, Frachot et al. (2001) reports potential reduction of 37.9% for the capital charge at the 99.9% confidence level. 
10 Other copulae, such as the extreme value copulea, could lead to larger changes, but this topic is outside the scope of our 
study and we leave it for further research.  18 
dependence between cells and independence). For ease of comparison, we have also performed a 
standardization by the BIA, SA and full-dependence AMA capital charges. 
 
Insert Table 10 approximately here 
 
These results show that a very conservative AMA approach (Extreme Value Theory + external data, 
full dependence) leads to a heavier capital charge than the Standardized Approach. However, when 
dependence is correctly specified, the capital charge can be reduced by more than 35% and the AMA 
becomes the least capital consuming approach of all. 
 
Other elements are noteworthy: first, if the capital charge obtained with the SA seems quite low as 
compared to the default AMA, this is partly due to the nature of our dataset. Indeed, the SA derives the 
capital charge, for each business lines, by simply applying a given factor (called “ beta”) to the 
business line’s gross income. This factor varies from 12 to 18%. The business lines considered in this 
study (Retail Banking and Asset Management) both have the lowest beta factors in the Basel II 
framework (12%). Thus the total capital charge for the SA is particularly attractive in our case. 
Moreover, while the operational losses of the four cells (used to fit the distributions in the AMA) 
represent more than 70% of the total database, the corresponding gross income (used in the other two 
approaches) only amounts to 35% of the total gross income of the bank. Here again, it is thus not very 
surprising to see a relatively low capital charge for the SA when compared to the AMA.  
 
6.  Managing operational risk  
 
At the present time, the assessment of operational risk still remains a delicate endeavor, due in part to 
the intrinsic difficulty of the exercise, to its exploratory stage of development, to the scarcity of data, 
and to the new regulatory definitions of operational risk events and of business lines of activity. 
Furthermore, unlike credit risk or market risk, operational risk is endogenous to the institution. It is 
linked to the nature and the complexity of the activities, to the processes and the systems in place, and 
to the quality of the management and of the information flows, to name but a few factors. For this 
reason, superficially similar financial institutions might end up with very different operational losses.  
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is well aware of these difficulties and adopts a 
pragmatic approach to operational risk supervision, leaving banks free to assess their operational risk 
profile themselves provided that they display sufficient sound practices of operational risk supervision 
and management.  
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But even before the consequences of the enforcement of the Accord are considered, this new banking 
regulation has had a tremendous impact on the organization and on the intensity of the operational risk 
management in banking institutions.  
 
Of course, operational risk management is not really new in the banking sector. Long before regulators 
addressed these issues, internal and external fraud were monitored and prosecuted by the internal audit 
department. Information Technology departments and IT controllers were already aiming at 
preventing breaches of security on the information system, guarantying data integrity, and protecting 
web-sites from hacking attempts. To insure the going-concern of the activities in case of major system 
breakdowns or physical damages, Business Continuity Plans had been set up and tested in most large 
financial institutions.  
 
The great merit of the Basel reform is to have put a common name on a myriad of existing practices. 
Shedding light on these heterogeneous practices, the Basel requirements for operational risk 
management and supervision have provided a powerful incentive to improve the organization and to 
expand the scope of this activity.  
 
The specificity of operational losses and their link to the unique features of each institution makes both 
the modeling of these losses more difficult, and the active risk management techniques absolutely 
necessary. These risk management actions may in turn influence the value of the input parameters of 
risk assessment models, as we will show in the following section. 
 
Operational risks include events as various as fraud, business disruption, processing errors, or business 
malpractice. Despite its heterogeneous nature, some key techniques of operational risk management 
emerge both from the banking sector and from the literature. These techniques can be classified in 
various ways, according to their goals, their nature, or their stage of actions, but the general principles 
underlying risk management approaches remain the same. 
 
Risk management involves f our stages: risk identification, measurement, monitoring, and 
management. Risk identification is typically performed via risk and controls self-assessment at the 
department level, by analyzing internal audit report, and checking lists of key risks indicators. But the 
internal incident reporting database is also a powerful tool to assess potential or existing operational 
risks in an institution. Splitting the analysis among frequency and severity of events helps identifying 
potential large losses, and possible breaches in control. 
 
Rare events implying large loss amounts are the first candidates in the identification of uncapped risks. 
When the incident database includes abnormal amounts of losses, specific investigations are required  20 
in order to precisely identify the circumstances that have led to such losses. Likewise, recurrent losses 
of small amounts identified in the incident database require, at least once, further investigation. They 
might either be the consequence of an effective cap of losses in an activity that is highly exposed to 
operational risks, or a structural flaw in the process, possibly leading to systematic, or frequent losses, 
with very large amounts at stake. 
 
After the risk identification stage, risk measurement constitutes the quantitative aspect of risk 
management. It has been extensively dealt with in other sections of this paper.  
 
Risk monitoring implies a dynamic analysis of the evolution of the losses. This is best performed by 
Key Risk Indicators (KRI) analysis and operational dashboards, specifically designed per activity. 
Dashboards of operational events are useful tools to involve the management of a department in the 
operational risks issues. Efficient dashboards are synthetic, issued on a regular basis in a standardized 
format, listing top events with their main cause, and relating the amounts of losses as a percentage of 
the gross margin.  
 
Operational risk management involves a multitude of techniques and approaches that essentially serve 
two purposes: average loss reduction and catastrophic loss avoidance. Some of these techniques help 
the average loss reduction, some the event avoidance, some both.  
 
The next section simulates the impact of specific risk management actions on loss distribution, and on 
average financial performance.  
 
7. Assessing the impact of OR management 
 
7.1. Mapping of risk management actions on loss distributions 
 
One of the main motivations underlying the new Basel Accord is to encourage banks to adopt effective 
management procedures against operational risks since any reduction in risk exposure should lead, in 
principle, to a reduction of the associated capital charge.  
 
The somewhat recent history of data in our sample does not allow us to empirically test the impact of 
ORM on the losses of a financial institution. However, we can best guess the possible effects of some 
risk management actions: Table 11 reviews some active management actions and their possible impact 
on the parameters of the loss distributions, either in frequency or in severity.  
 
Insert Table 11 approximately here  21 
 
On the basis of the first four actions listed in Table 11, we have performed a sensitivity analysis on 
both the expected losses and the economic capital required. This kind of analysis serves the purpose of 
indicating where managers should target their efforts in order to undertake the most efficient actions, 
be it in terms of their impact on regulatory capital, or in terms of loss reduction.  
 
7.2. Impact of ORM on the RAROC  
 
The methodology developed here produces the necessary tools to estimate the quantitative impact of 
these approaches on the RAROC and, in turn, on the tariffs applicable to financial products.  
 
RAROC stands for Risk Adjusted Return on Capital. This performance measure – initially developed 
by consultant experts in the banking sector in the early nineties – expresses the adjusted return of an 
investment for its risk, related to the economic capital consumed when undertaking this investment. 
RAROC calculations may be equally well applied to a single transaction (a loan authorization, for 
instance), a client (e.g. the total business generated with a given client), a segment of clientele (retail, 
SME’s…), or even a business unit.  
 






=         (4) 
 
The adjustment for risk in RAROC takes place both at the numerator and the denominator of the ratio. 
The nominal return of the investment considered is first adjusted by reducing its amount by the 
expected losses (EL) that are assessed for a transaction of this type. The expected losses can be 
defined as the average losses previously observed for similar operations.  
 
The denominator – the economic capital – also reflects the risk taken with a transaction, since it is the 
capital internally calculated as the amount of own funds necessary to cover the losses with the 
confidence interval required for this activity. 
 
Until recently, the RAROC performance measure has been mostly used in the credit activities of 
banks. The underlying idea is to make sure that the revenues generated by a loan or by a client are 
sufficient to cover the remuneration of the regulatory capital that it consumes.  
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With the Basel Accord now defining regulatory capital for operational risks as well, banks should 
apply an analogous RAROC approach with operational risk. In the spirit of this foreseeable evolution 
of the sector, we are left with the task of adapting the general RAROC formula to the specific case of 
operational risk.  
 
In order to obtain a proper RAROC measurement adapted to operational risk, we must introduce : 
-  the Expected Losses due to operational events; 
-  the Economic Capital necessary to cover the unexpected operational losses; 
-  the Revenues generated by taking operational risks. 
 
The first two inputs are readily obtained with our methodology, as the fitted (multivariate) distribution 
of operational losses provides both the expected aggregate loss and the quantile for the regulatory 
99.9% OpVaR used to determine regulatory capital. Note that the SA and the BIA do not entail the 
computation of the expected losses. Nevertheless, we consider that a natural way to tackle this 
measurement is to fit a distribution to the entire set of observed losses and to take the expected value 
of this distribution for each cell. For our dataset, this yields fitted lognormal distributions with 
parameters (0.964 ; 2.604) for “Asset Management/Private Banking” and (0.262 ; 2.510) for “Retail 
Banking”. Of course, this rather arbitrary method is to be considered for the sole purpose of 
illustration. 
 
The estimation of the revenues associated with operational risks represents a more complex challenge. 
In RAROC, revenues equal the gross pre-tax margin generated by an activity, plus fees and other 
revenues; all costs besides the risk costs that are represented by the EL are neglected. But unlike credit 
risk whose counterpart in revenues can be identified, we reach here the fundamental question of the 
existence of operational revenues in counterpart of operational risks. Strictly speaking, operational 
revenues are null. We plead for a less restrictive view, though, since even pure market or credit 
activities, and  a fortiori those that generate other types of revenues like the fee business (asset 
management, private banking, custody, payments and transaction) involve relatively large components 
of business risk as well as operational risk that call for compensation through an adequate tariff policy. 
These risks are no longer mapped on particular securities or portfolios like credit or market risks, but 
at a broader level on the aggregate profit center that generates them. 
 
We do acknowledge the existence of business risk in activities such as asset management, retail 
banking or private banking. However, Basel II does not prescribe regulatory capital to cover business 
risk. Since we cannot distinguish operational risk from business risk in these activities, we will make 
some assumptions regarding the proportion of total revenues that are generated as a counterpart for 
operational risk.   23 
 
In the spirit of this discussion, the “operational” RAROC of business line i writes: 
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Based on the quantitative analysis in the previous sections, we have all data needed to calculate the 
Operational RAROC (RAROCO): Revenues, Expected Losses, and Economic Capital. We start by 
assuming that the revenues due to operational risk represent a fixed proportion of the revenues 
generated by a business line. We set this proportion to an arbitrary 5% for the sake of the illustration, 
although we do not view this percentage as unrealistic. The results are reported in the first three 
columns of Panels A and B in Table 12:  
 
Insert Table 12 approximately here 
 
In Panel B of Table 12, we obtain that the RAROCO for the business line “Asset Management & 
Private Banking” i s equal to 27.7%, 34.62% and 22.58% with the Basic Indicator Approach, the 
Standardized Approach and the Advanced Measurement Approach, respectively. For the “Retail 
Banking” Business line, we get values of 29.46% for BIA, 36.83% for SA and 23.12% for AMA. 
Overall, the RAROC is maximized when one uses the AMA with explicit account for dependence 
between cells, with a value of 36.26% 
 
Once again, the Standardized Approach seems to yield the most favorable rates of return for this 
particular sample. Yet, these results are extremely contingent on the choice of the expected loss for the 
BIA and the SA, whose impact on RAROC is very important. Of much more interest is the great 
improvement that can be achieved by the dependence-corrected RAROC, showing an increase of more 
than 50% in risk-adjusted profitability and closely matching the very generous estimates for the BIA 
and SA. 
 
7.3. Sensitivity analysis  
 
Table 11 presented several possible risk management actions that can and could be implemented in 
financial institutions entering the AMA. We detail here the impact of the first four lines: the “Lessons 
Learned”, assumed to limit the risk of future large losses by removing the k largest losses for the cells 
under consideration; the use of “Dashboards”, meant to reduce the expected frequency of events by 
x%; the “audit tracking”, aimed at reducing the expected frequency by x% and the magnitude of the  24 
severity by y% for the “Internal Fraud” and “Execution, Process and Delivery Management” event 
types; and finally the “Business Line Reorganization”, whose purpose is to reduce frequency and 
severity of the losses in business line i by x% and y% respectively. Other actions provided in Table 11 
are for illustrative purposes only, as they focus on business lines and/or event types that are not 
covered in our 4-cells study. 
 
To run our analysis we assume the following scenario: the Bank has adopted the AMA approach to 
compute the capital charge for operational risk and it has the stated objective of a target Return On 
Equity (ROE) of 12%. Target profitability levels are indeed frequently used in practice, and this one 
corresponds to a very common value. This corresponds to a RAROC hurdle rate at 18% after 
accounting for the tax rate, since RAROC is a performance measure before tax. Moreover, the Board 
of the Bank intends to reduce the Expected Loss (EL) by 15% for strategic purposes. The Risk 
Manager is thus asked to look at different possible actions and to run a cost-benefit analysis of each of 
these actions.   
 
We adopt a two-stage approach to solve this problem: first, we assess the performance (i.e. the value 
of the parameters k, x and y above) required for each action in order to reach a 15% reduction of the 
EL. Then, we couple these performance requirements with the return constraint (i.e. keeping a 
RAROCO equal to 18%) to measure the maximum acceptable cost for each action. If the cost to reach 
the performance requirements for a given action is higher than this maximum acceptable cost, the 
action is rejected. Otherwise, it can enter into consideration. 
 
To reach a 15% reduction of the EL
11, the various actions must fulfill some performance requirements: 
-  The “Lessons Learned” action allows an overall 15% reduction of the EL if the parameter k is 2. 
Note that in this case, the EL reductions for the fours cells are 37%, 15%, 18% and 11% for “Asset 
Management / Clients…”, “Asset Management / Execution,…”, “Retail Banking / Clients…” and 
“Retail Banking / Execution…”, respectively. 
-  The “Dashboards” action can obviously provide the wanted reduction by decreasing the EL of 
each “cell” by 15%, which corresponds to a reduction of loss frequency of 15%, 14%, 15% and 
14% for “Asset Management / Clients…”, “Asset Management / Execution,…”, “Retail Banking / 
Clients…” and “Retail Banking / Execution…”, respectively. This indicates a quasi-linear 
relationship between frequency and Expected Loss. 
-  The “Audit Tracking” action only impacts the “Internal Fraud” and “Execution, Process and 
Delivery Management” event types. As we do not cover “Internal Fraud” in our examples, only 
two cells will be impacted by this action: “Asset Management / Execution…” and “Retail Banking 
                                                        
11 In our case, the EL must be reduced from about 855.000 units to about 725.000. 
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/ Execution…”. The estimated severity reduction is quite low with this type of action, so that we 
assume a 4% severity reduction for these two cells. The needed frequency reductions are then 15% 
and 13%, respectively. 
-  The “Business Line Reorganization” only impacts the related business line, of course. In our 
case, we assume a reorganization of the Retail Banking business line. To illustrate an action 
having a larger impact on severity than the “Audit Tracking” one, we assume a 10% reduction of 
severity for the “Retail Banking” business line. This leads to an additional requirement of a 12% 
reduction of the loss frequency for this activity. 
Table 13 summarizes the impact of these actions on the important input of the bank’s profitability.  
 
Insert Table 13 approximately here 
 
Notice that different actions, while leading to the same reduction of the expected losses, have different 
impacts on the unexpected loss and thus on the regulatory capital. Comparison of the “Lessons 
Learned” and “Dashboards” effects reveals that the effort to reduce frequency of losses appears to be 
more effective than the cutting of the more extreme ones. In general, our analysis renders more 
favorable outcomes for actions whose targets are more directed to the business line “Retail Banking” 
(cells (2,1) and (2,2)). Due to the calibration of the loss distribution function performed in Table 6 for 
this Business Line, the effect of a reduction in expected loss on the unexpected loss – and thus on the 
OpVaR – is greater than for the “Asset Management” Business Line. This phenomenon is not readily 
observable from the values reported in Table 6, and is apparently not related to the balance of efforts 
between frequency and severity of losses either. Although one could argue that the high weight of cell 
(2,2) drives the impact of managerial actions on regulatory capital, this conjecture is invalidated by the 
relatively lower impact of the “Audit Tracking” scenario, directly targeting this cell, with respect to 
the “Dashboards” scenario that splits its effect throughout the matrix. Rather, the impact of managerial 
actions seems to be due to the particular calibration of the distribution functions for the aggregate 
losses, as the non-systematic behavior of the relationship between expected and unexpected losses 
suggests.  
 
Table 14 provides an overview of the major results linked with a successful implementation of these 
actions. 
Insert Table 14 approximately here 
 
In all cases, by reducing the EL and the Economic Capital, operational risk management measures 
improve the RAROC performance of the Business Lines to a significant extent. Panel B of Table 14 
shows that RAROC increases from 23.2% to around 27% after completion of the management actions.  
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If the performance requirements described above are met, the loss reduction objective subject to the 
profitability constraint is achieved. But such actions are not for free and a cost-benefit analysis is 
needed to ensure the costs associated with putting the action into place are less than the benefits it 
provides. To do so, we can apply a backward reasoning and assess the percentage of revenues needed 
to cover the operational expected losses, and the operational economic capital, in order to maintain a 
RAROC at 18%. The lower this percentage, the better it is for the business line.  
 
This more normative method allows us to draw a direct relationship between the cost supported by a 
financial institution to bring some corrective measures to its operational risk exposure and the impact 
of this particular action on its risk exposure. Specifically, we obtain values of 4.37%, 3.89%, 3.80%, 
3.86% and 3.78% for the default AMA, “Lessons Learned”, “Dashboard”, “Audit Tracking” and 
“Business Line Reorganization” actions, respectively. The maximum acceptable cost is simply the 
difference between the revenues needed to cover operational risk before and after the action is 
undertaken. 
 
Table 14 provides the maximum acceptable cost associated with each action, both in terms of currency 
units (Panel C) and percentage of total income (Panel D). For instance, if the costs of launching a 
“Dashboards” action, allowing for a 15% reduction of the EL, amounts to less than 230,000 currency 
units, then the required profitability level is maintained and the action can be accepted. 
 
Of course, the assessment of the business implications of these figures for the desirability of such 
actions for an individual bank is beyond the scope of this paper. At the very least, our approach may 
enable financial institutions to readily and consistently assess the impact of their risk mitigating 
decisions on their tariffs and, ultimately, on their profitability. 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks  
 
In this paper, we have attempted to provide some elements to consistently address two major issues 
triggered by the emergence of operational risk coverage in the scope of the Basel II Accord. The red 
wire of our approach was the constant care about the trade-off between parsimony in the 
parameterization of the distribution of operational losses, and the accuracy of the resulting fit.  
 
As for the first research question, namely the cost-benefit analysis of adopting the AMA for covering 
operational losses instead of a less sophisticated method, two major conclusions can be drawn.  
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First, the dependence structure of operational losses per business lines and/or event types and the 
behavior of extremely large losses reported by other institutions in an external database are both likely 
to significantly affect the cost-saving properties of the AMA choice. Since this approach aims at 
capturing rare events, it tends to be overly conservative when the basic assumption of additive capital 
charges (perfect correlation) is adopted. The reduction in risk exposure is significant when dependence 
is taken into account in a reasonable way. More surprisingly, a proper handling of external data allows 
a refinement of the analysis of the tail of the aggregate loss distribution, which may lead to reduction 
of operational capital charges thanks to the richer sample of high severity data. 
 
Second, the differential capital charge between the Standardized Approach and the AMA, and thus the 
opportunity cost of adopting a heavy operational risk management system, significantly hinges on the 
discretionary weight assigned to the business lines. For the selected business lines, the Basel 
Committee has set the lowest weighting coefficients (12%) among the partition of activities of 
financial institutions. On the basis of our results, these low values result in quite limited gains in 
regulatory capital charges by the AMA approach. This leaves a very important question open: is the 
choice of these beta coefficients by the Basel Committee likely to favor the adoption of the SA by 
financial institutions whose activities lean towards the business lines with lower weighting 
coefficients? If this is the case, one should observe in the near future a banking behavior towards 
“regulatory arbitrage”, where financial institutions would be eager to select the most favorable 
approach on the basis of the more or less important advantage brought by beta coefficients that are 
most relevant to their activities. Alternatively, and probably more prudently, one may argue that the 
beta coefficients of the Standardized Approach represent an average proportion of gross income that 
should be allocated as regulatory capital by financial institutions. As we have mentioned earlier, unlike 
credit or market risk, operational risk is primarily a matter that is internal and specific to each bank. 
Therefore, the choice of the SA may be favorable to some banks whose actual risk is greater than 
average, and unfavorable to others. A study focusing on a single institution is by no means able to 
answer the crucial question of the fairness of the beta coefficients, but this paper at least provides 
useful information for the bank under study about the implications of the alternative 
 
Our answer to the second question, namely the cost-benefit of adopting a full-fledged operational risk 
management system, has slightly less normative content than methodological substance. We have 
shown that the concept of RAROC can be adopted if adapted in conjunction with our modular 
estimation technique in order to yield a mapping between the results of a particular action and its 
associated cost. With controlled scenarios, we have documented that managerial actions are likely to 
bring significant improvements on the risk-adjusted profitability of the institution.  
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Interestingly, the arbitrage between different managerial actions is not necessarily tied to the focus on 
the number, frequency or severity of the losses, but rather to the very distributional behavior of the 
aggregate loss for each business line and event type. This finding suggests that the analysis of risk 
management effects is all but trivial. A proper examination of managerial efforts to reduce operational 
risks intimately builds on a thorough understanding of statistical characteristics of operational losses. 
 
We believe that this experiment contributes to understanding the profit side of operational risk 
management, and should usefully be matched with a more industrial view on the cost-side of these 
types of actions, which is beyond the scope of our study of course. 
 
Both aspects of this research may bear numerous extensions, provided more extensive and robust 
databases are made available. We emphasize that this paper has to be primarily taken for its 
methodological aspects, even though the use of real data may have contributed to the persuasiveness 
of our results. Only when banks have eventually collected operational data – on loss events but also on 
corrective devices – on a systematic basis, the full potential of this very promising area of research 
will find a practical achievement.  29 
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Figure 2 
Mean Excess Plot (MEP) for the cell “Retail Banking / Clients, Products and Business Practices” (Cell 
(2,1)) 
 
This  graph represents the function ( ) ( ) { } n k X e X n k n n k ,..., 1 : , , , =  where  en is the empirical mean 
excess function whose mathematical expression is 














where u is the threshold and the Xi’s are the nu observations such that Xi > u. The MEP should be 
approximately a straight line with slope x / (1-x). So the goal is to detect a significant shift in slope at 
some high point. When the empirical plot seems to follow a reasonably straight line with positive 
gradient above a certain value, this indicates a heavy-tailed distribution. 
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Figure 3 
Quantile-Quantile plot (QQ-plot) for the “normal” losses (i.e. < 675) with a Lognormal (0.86, 2.84) 
distribution for the cell “Retail Banking / Clients, Products and Business Practices”.  
 









This graph plots the sample quantiles of X versus theoretical quantiles of the tested distribution, which 
is a Lognormal (0.86, 2.84) in this example. If the fit is good, the points should form a straight line. 
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Figure 4 
Frequency, Severity and Aggregated Loss distributions for the cell “Retail Banking / Clients, Products 




These graphs plots the three distributions involved in the computation of the regulatory capital charge. 
The upper graph is the frequency distribution, fitted here with a Poisson(235) distribution. The middle 
graph is the severity distribution, composed of a mix of three distributions: a lognormal(0.86, 2.84) for 
the losses under 675, a GPD(0.735, 542) for the losses between 675 and the external data threshold 
and a Lognormal(9.04, 1.53) for the losses above this threshold. The lower graph is the  n-fold 
convolution of the severity distribution with itself (n being a random variable that follows the selected 
frequency distribution), obtained with 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations. 
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Figure 5 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for the operational loss database  
 
  Panel A: Operational losses per business lines 








Corporate Finance  874  428  175  5 
Trading & Sales  62,638  10,197  1,027  61 
Retail Banking  368,686  51,051  181  2,033 
Private Banking  382,047  347,115  3,537  108 
Commercial Banking  9,631  3,032  419  23 
Payment and Settlement  70,653  19,050  1,070  66 
Agency Services   11,194  228  95  118 
Asset Management  166,832  91,878  285  585 
Retail Brokerage  102  102  102  1 
Total  1,072,554  347,115  358  3,000 
 
  Panel B: Operational losses per event types 








Internal fraud  55,470  51,051  6,163  9 
External fraud  131,754  15,706  308  428 
Employment practices & 
workplace safety  5,142  2,487  1,714  3 
 Damage to physical assets  0  0  -  0 
Clients, Product & 
Business Practices   411,601  347,115  1,169  352 
Business disruption & 
system failures  17,797  2,055  157  113 
Execution, Delivery & 
Process Management 
450,790  91,878  215  2,095 
Total  1,072,554  347,115  358  3,000 
 
This table reports summary statistics of our sample of operational losses. The monetary unit has been 
rescaled with a constant amount. The time scale has been set to the necessary length to collect 3000 
losses. All amounts reported in the table are in hundreds of units.  37 
Table 2 
Summary statistics for the selected sub-sample 
 
Panel A: Number of events for the selected sub-matrix 
  Event type   
Business line 
Clients, Product & 
Business Practices 
Execution, Delivery & 
Process Management 
Total 
Private Banking + Asset Management  75  613  688 
Retail Banking  235  1,395  1,630 
Total  310  2,008  2,318 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the selected cells 
  Business Line &Event Type 
  Asset Mgmt +  Private 
Banking / Clients, … 
(Cell 1,1) 
Asset Mgmt + Private 
Banking / Execution … 
(Cell 1,2) 
Retail Banking / 
Clients, … 
(Cell 2,1) 
Retail Banking / 
Execution, … 
(Cell 2,2) 
No. Obs.  75  613  235  1,395 
Median  51  28  29  20 
Mean  4,797  303  178  100 
Std. Dev.  40,063  3,812  505  471 
Total loss  359,781  186,009  41,747  139,479 
 
This table reports s ummary statistics of our selected sub-sample of operational losses. The cell 
coordinates correspond to the ones reported in Table 2.a.  38 
Table 3 
Selection of the cut-off threshold for Cell(2,1) 
 
Threshold  s  x  CVM  Percentage of 
extreme losses 
300  1720.7  0.337  1.123  11.06% 
325  1677.7  0.346  1.003  10.64% 
350  2439.7  0.274  1.444  9.79% 
375  2650.8  0.261  1.485  9.36% 
400  2945.6  0.244  1.553  8.94% 
425  3357.9  0.224  1.650  8.51% 
450  2520.3  0.274  1.211  8.51% 
475  1874.4  0.335  0.825  8.51% 
500  1365.4  0.409  0.500  8.51% 
525  956.3  0.505  0.244  8.51% 
550  1541.9  0.390  0.476  7.66% 
575  1079.3  0.485  0.240  7.66% 
600  1225.2  0.457  0.269  7.23% 
625  814.5  0.579  0.110  7.23% 
650  915.3  0.553  0.118  6.81% 
675  542.6  0.735  0.060  6.81% 
700  1508.4  0.425  0.217  5.96% 
725  929.3  0.571  0.082  5.96% 
750  475.6  0.823  0.096  5.96% 
775  621.0  0.737  0.059  5.53% 
800  1214.8  0.513  0.099  5.10% 
 
This table reports relevant fitted parameters for different candidate thresholds. Estimates s and  x 
correspond to the parameters estimates of the GPD distribution. The Cramer-von Mises’ goodness-of-
fit statistic (CVM) is reported for each threshold. The last column represents the percentage of extreme 
losses for a given threshold. The line corresponding to the selected threshold is reported in bold.   39 
Table 4 
Calibration of the fitted distributions for the cell Retail Banking / Clients, Products and Business 
Practices (Cell (2,1)) 
 
  “Normal Losses”    “Extreme Losses” 
Distribution  Gamma  Weibull  Lognormal    GPD 
Parameter 1  0.00007  1.0848  0.8614    0.7351 
Parameter 2  0.00397  0.2247  2.8399    542.47 
Log-likelihood  -1090.8  -1089.1  -1087.5     
KS  0.0811  0.0475  0.0485    - 
CVM  0.3642  0.0626  0.0592    - 
AD  1.7727  0.3822  0.3766    - 
 
This table reports calibrated parameters (using MLE) and goodness-of-fit statistics for the b ody 
("Normal Losses") and tails ("Large Losses") of the severity distribution of the cell Retail Banking / 
Clients, Products and Business Practices. The threshold separating both parts of the distribution is 675. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of results obtained with only internal data versus external data beyond the cut-off 
threshold for the cell “Retail Banking / Clients, Products and Business Practices”  
 
  Data used beyond cut-off threshold 
  Internal Measurement  External Data 
Real Total Loss  41,747  41,747 
Median  77,639  78,692 
Mean  94,947  100,095 
OpVaR90  139,937  159,452 
OpVaR95  183,015  219,599 
OpVaR99  373,095  447,089 
OpVaR99.5  528,393  579,121 
OpVaR99.9  1,466,094  1,157,484 
OpVaR99.95  1,859,723  1,384,734 
 
This table presents estimates of the OpVaR for the  selected cell. The fitted distributions are a 
lognormal (0.86, 2.84) for the “normal” losses (from the collection threshold,  L, to the cut-off 
threshold, U, in Figure 5), a GPD (542, 0.735) for the “large” losses (from U to the external data 
threshold, E in Figure 5) and a lognormal (9.04, 1.53) for the “extreme” losses (above E in Figure 5).  41 
Table 6 
Calibration of the fitted distributions using EVT and external data to model the tail 
 
  Business Line &Event Type 
  Asset Mgmt / 
Clients… 




Retail Banking / 
Execution… 
“Normal Losses”  Pareto  Log-Normal  Log-Normal  Log-Normal 
Parameter 1  6.79  2.33  0.86  1.62 
Parameter 2  0.06  1.78  2.84  0.17 
Threshold  375  350  675  225 
Percentage of losses 
above the threshold  10.7 %  6.5 %  6.8 %  6.6 % 
GPD 1 (x)  1.938  0.852  0.735  0.991 
GPD 2 (s)  183  677  542  205 
External data - 
Parameter 1 (m) 
10.02  9.11  9.04  10.02 
External data - 
Parameter 2 (s) 
1.45  1.54  1.53  1.67 
Real Total Loss  359,781  186,009  41,747  139,479 
Median  35,158  178,140  78,692  334,888 
Mean  48,873  220,789  100,095  485,652 
OpVaR_99  319,665  862,272  447,089  2,476,987 
OpVaR_99.5  499,438  1,117,328  579,121  2,979,825 
OpVaR_99.9  1,098,948  1,844,714  1,157,484  3,807,644 
Regulatory Capital  1,050,075  1,623,925  1,057,389  3,321,992 
 
This table reports distributional properties ("Normal Losses", “Large Losses” and “Extreme Losses”) 
of the severity of losses in the cells identified in Table 2. Three distributions are compared based on 
goodness-of-fit tests and the best one is used  to model the “normal” losses.  “Large” losses are 
modeled by the Generalized Pareto distribution while external data are fitted with a lognormal 
distribution. The mean loss is the proxy for the Expected Loss.  
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Table 7 
90%-confidence intervals for the capital charge  
 
  Lower bound  Estimate  Upper bound 
Cell(1,1)  750,579  1,050,075  1,349,571 
Cell(1,2)  1,216,364  1,623,925  2,031,486 
Cell(2,1)  696,580  1,057,389  1,418,198 
Cell(2,2)  3,032,751  3,321,992  3,611,233 
Total – ind.  5,696,274  7,053,381  8,410,488 
Total – dep.  6,368,072  7,053,381  7,738,690 
       
Cell(1,1)  71%  100%  129% 
Cell(1,2)  75%  100%  125% 
Cell(2,1)  66%  100%  134% 
Cell(2,2)  91%  100%  109% 
Total – ind.  81%  100%  119% 
Total – dep.  90%  100%  110% 
 
This table reports intervals obtained through a bootstrapping approach using 500 iterations and 
applying the Central Limit Theorem with the quantiles estimates. It is assumed that CCi ~ N(mi , s i), 
with i = 1,…,4 and where CCi is the Capital Charge of cell i, mi is the mean of the capital charge 
estimates for cell i and s i  is the standard deviation of the capital charge estimates for cell i. If the 
individual capital charges estimates are assumed to be independent, then TCCI ~ N(mT , sT) where 
TCCI is the total capital charge,  ￿ = =
4




i i T s s . If the individual capital charges 
estimates are assumed to be fully positive dependent, then TCCD ~ N(mT , sT) where TCCD is the 
total capital charge,  ￿ = =
4
1 i i T m m and  ￿ = =
4
1 i i T s s . 
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Table 8 
Spearman’s rank correlations between frequencies of risks 
 
Panel A. Spearman’s rank correlation matrix for the selected cells  
  Cell(1,1)  Cell(1,2)  Cell(2,1)  Cell(2,2) 
Cell(1,1)  1.000       
Cell(1,2)  -0.253  1.000     
Cell(2,1)  0.565  0.000  1.000   
Cell(2,2)  -0.408  0.260  -0.248  1.000 
 
 
Panel B. Spearman’s rank correlation matrix for the selected business lines 
  Asset Management 
/ Private Banking 
Retail Banking 
Asset Management / 
Private Banking  1.000   
Retail Banking  0.155  1.000 
 
 
Panel C. Spearman’s rank correlation matrix for all the business lines 










Asset Mgt / 
Private Bkg 
Trading & Sales  1.000           
Retail Banking  0.162  1.000         
Commercial Banking  0.000  0.084  1.000       
Payment & 
Settlement  0.299  0.253  0.197  1.000     
Agency Services  0.293  0.156  0.565  0.423  1.000   
Asset Management / 
Private Banking  0.063  0.155  0.269  0.187  0.291  1.000 
 
This table reports the rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s rho) between observations of 
operational loss events in the selected cells. Two business lines (Corporate Finance and Retail 
Brokerage) have not been considered due to the very low number of observations (5 and 1, 
respectively).  44 
Table 9 
Comparison of results obtained with different dependence assumptions.  
 







Real Total Loss  727,014  727,014  727,014  727,014 
Median  626,878  666,647  698,404  699,953 
Mean  855,409  846,516  853,259  849,140 
OpVaR_95.00  2,139,472  1,947,965  1,811,360  1,781,489 
OpVaR_99.00  4,106,013  3,320,426  3,032,034  2,868,935 
OpVaR_99.90  7,908,790  5,379,562  4,487,290  4,192,533 
OpVaR_99.95  9,184,315  6,098,291  4,863,845  4,390,021 
Capital Charge  7,053,381  4,533,046  3,634,030  3,343,393 
 
This table reports capital charge estimates under different dependence assumptions. The full positive 
dependence is Basel II’s default assumption. Insurance policies are taken into account.  45 
Table 10 
Comparison of total capital charges  
 
  Capital Charge  Base 100 
Basic Indicator 
Approach 
7,470,036  100  106  125 
Standardized 
Approach  5,976,029  80  100  85 
AMA – Full 
dependence   7,053,381  94  118  100 
AMA –  BL 
dependence  4,533,046  61  76  64 
AMA –  Cell 
dependence  3,634,030  49  61  52 
AMA –  
Independence 
3,343,393  45  56  47 
 
 
This table reports capital charge estimates obtained when adopting the AMA approach (with different 
dependence assumptions) versus other Basel II approaches. In the third, fourth and fifth columns, the 
figures have been normalized by the estimates obtained with the BIA, SA and full-dependence AMA 
figures, respectively, in order to ease comparison. 
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Table 11 
Overview of selected managerial actions and their consequences  
 
Risk Management Action    Impact on the distribution 
Lessons learned 
Analysis of largest losses in Business 
Line (BL) “i” 
  Cut off the x top losses, all Business Lines 
Dashboard  
Systematic reduction of events in BL “i”, 
event types “j,k,l” 
  Minus x% in the number of events in Business Line 
“i”, for the event types “j,k,l”. 
Audit tracking  
Application of audit recommendations in 
BL “i” 
  Minus x% in the number of events in BL “i”, minus 
y% in the severity of losses for event types: 
•  internal fraud 
•  processing errors 
Business line reorganization  
New product review process for all BL 
  Minus x% in frequency and minus y% in severity for 
event types “Clients, products and business 
practices”,  
Rapid reaction to OR event     Minus x% in severity, all BL and all event types 
Business Continuity Plan    Minus x% in severity for event types of business 
disruption and system failure (if non existent in the 
original distribution) 
External Insurance Policies    Truncation of the distribution at the level of the 
amounts insured 
 
This table reports an overview of possible managerial actions taken in order to reduce the exposure to 
operational risk. The first four actions are examined in the scenario analysis. The actions in italics are 
reported for illustrative purposes. 
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Table 12 
Base-case effects of operational losses on RAROC 
 
Panel A: Value estimates 
  Gross Income  Actual Loss  EL BIA and SA  EL AMA 
BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking 
17,463,358  545,790  147.619  269,434 
BL2 – Retail Banking  32,336,881  181,226  187.773  604,381 
TOTAL  49,800,239  727,016  335.392  873,815 
 
Panel B: Operational RAROC  
RAROCO  BIA  SA  Default AMA  Default AMA - 
Copula 
BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking 
27.70%  34.62%  22.58%  - 
BL2 – Retail Banking  29.46%  36.83%  23.12%  - 
TOTAL  28.84%  36.05%  22.91%  36.26% 
 
Panel C: Compensation levels (in currency units) for operational risk. 
Minimum Income  BIA  SA  Default AMA  Default AMA - Copula 
BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking 
619,130  524,828  750,754  - 
BL2 – Retail Banking  1,060,869  886,250  1,392,670  - 
TOTAL  1,679,998  1,411,077  2,143,424  1,662,464 
 
Panel D: Compensation levels (in percentage of total income) for operational risk  
Income in % of total revenues  BIA  SA  Default AMA  Default AMA - Copula 
BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking 
3.55%  3.01%  4.30%  - 
BL2 – Retail Banking  3.28%  2.74%  4.31%  - 
TOTAL  3.37%  2.83%  4.30%  3.34% 
 
This table presents the effects of our estimates of operational risks on the bank’s risk-adjusted 
profitability, measured by the Operational RAROC (RAROCO). For Panel B, the operational income 
is set to 5% of the total revenue. For Panels C and D, target RAROCO is set to 18%. For BIA and SA, 
the expected loss is taken as the expected value taken for fitted distributions for observed data: 
Lognormal (0.964 ; 2.604) for BL1 and Lognormal (0.262 ; 2.510) for BL2.  48  49 
 
Table 14 
Scenario analysis on Operational RAROC of managerial actions  
 
Panel A: Capital charge associated with managerial actions  
  Default 
AMA 
Lessons 




BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking  2,674,000  2,416,723  2,517,013  2,556,748  2,674,000 
BL2 – Retail Banking  4,379,381  4,207,900  3,954,635  4,085,998  3,739,444 
TOTAL  7,053,381  6,624,623  6,471,648  6,642,746  6,413,444 
 
Panel B: Operational RAROC 
RAROCO  Default 
AMA 
Lessons 




BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking  22.57%  27.11%  25.54%  25.23%  22.57% 
BL2 – Retail Banking  23.54%  25.94%  28.32%  27.37%  31.02% 
TOTAL  23.17%  26.36%  27.24%  26.55%  27.49% 
 
Panel C: Maximum acceptable cost (in currency units) by action  
Minimum Income  Default 
AMA 
Lessons 




BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking 
-  98,003  67,550  62,663  - 
BL2 – Retail Banking  -  91,112  165,387  140,041  243,922 
TOTAL  -  189,114  232,937  202,704  243,922 
 
Panel D: Maximum acceptable cost (in percentage of total income) by action  
Income in % of total revenues  Default 
AMA 
Lessons 




BL1 – Asset 
Management/Private Banking  -  0.56%  0,39%  0.36%  - 
BL2 – Retail Banking  -  0.28%  0,51%  0.43%  0.75% 
TOTAL  -  0.38%  0,47%  0.41%  0.49% 
 
This table presents the effects of managerial actions leading to a 15% decrease of the Expected Loss 
on several indicators. In Panel B, Operational Income = 5% Total Income. In Panels C and D, Target-
RAROCO is 18%. 
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Appendix 1 – Functional form of the statistical distributions 
 
a. “Normal” losses 
Here are the functional forms of the distributions used in this study: 
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b. “Large” losses 
The POT approach of the Extreme Value Theory is based on the Generalized Pareto Distribution. The 
GPD with threshold  u has two parameters:  s (the scale parameter) and  x (the tail index). Its 
cumulative density function (CDF) can be expressed as 
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where the “threshold excess” y is simply x – u. The GPD can thus be thought of as the conditional 
distribution of X given X > u. 
 
c. Copulae 
The bivariate version of Frank’s copula can be described as 
( )( )
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v u C  
while the Gaussian copula is expressed as  
( ) ) ( ), ( ) , (
1 1 v u v u C
- - F F F = r  
where  Fr is the bivariate normal distribution with correlation  r and  F is the standard normal 
distribution. 
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Appendix 2 – Descriptive statistics of the external database 
 
Here is a summary of the descriptive statistics for the external data (in millions USD) 
  Cell (1,1)  Cell (1,2)  Cell (2,1)  Cell (2,2)  Total 
No. Observations  38  3  161  23  224 
Mean (raw losses)  39.2  242,297.2  52.8  45.2  49.6 
Mean (scaled losses)  27.7  2,150.6  50.5  46.9  45.8 
Std.Dev. (raw losses)  109.6  419,600.4  179.7  161.3  166.7 
Std.Dev. (scaled losses)  65.6  3,540.9  188.2  168.6  166.9 
Median (raw losses)  7.5  80.0  7.0  5.6  6.7 
Median (scaled losses)  6.8  211.9  6.4  5.2  6.4 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the filtered external losses database. Filters have been applied 
to keep only losses coming from banks of similar countries (Europe, USA, Japan, Australia) and 
whose gross income was available (for scaling purposes).  52 
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM - WORKING PAPERS SERIES 
 
1.  "Model-based inflation forecasts and monetary policy rules" by M. Dombrecht and R. Wouters, 
Research Series, February 2000. 
2.  "The use of robust estimators as measures of core inflation" by L. Aucremanne, Research Series, 
February 2000. 
3.  "Performances économiques des Etats-Unis dans les années nonante" by A. Nyssens, 
P. Butzen, P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2000. 
4.  "A model with explicit expectations for Belgium" by P. Jeanfils, Research Series, March 2000. 
5.  "Growth in an open economy: some recent developments" by S. Turnovsky, Research Series, 
May 2000. 
6.  "Knowledge, technology and economic growth: an OECD perspective" by I. Visco, A. Bassanini, 
S. Scarpetta, Research Series, May 2000. 
7.  "Fiscal policy and growth in the context of European integration" by P. Masson, Research Series, 
May 2000. 
8.  "Economic growth and the labour market: Europe's challenge" by C. Wyplosz, Research Series, 
May 2000. 
9.  "The role of the exchange rate in economic growth: a euro-zone perspective" by R. MacDonald, 
Research Series, May 2000. 
10.  "Monetary union and economic growth" by J. Vickers, Research Series, May 2000. 
11.  "Politique monétaire et prix des actifs: le cas des Etats-Unis" by Q. Wibaut, Document Series, 
August 2000. 
12.  "The Belgian industrial confidence indicator: leading indicator of economic activity in the euro 
area?" by J.J. Vanhaelen, L. Dresse, J. De Mulder, Document Series, November 2000. 
13.  "Le financement des entreprises par capital-risque" by C. Rigo, Document Series, February 2001. 
14.  "La nouvelle économie" by P. Bisciari, Document Series, March 2001. 
15.  "De kostprijs van bankkredieten" by A. Bruggeman and R. Wouters, Document Series, April 2001. 
16.  "A guided tour of the world of rational expectations models and optimal policies" by Ph. Jeanfils, 
Research Series, May 2001. 
17.  "Attractive Prices and Euro - Rounding effects on inflation" by L. Aucremanne and D. Cornille, 
Documents Series, November 2001. 
18.  "The interest rate and credit channels in Belgium: an investigation with micro-level firm data" by 
P. Butzen, C. Fuss and Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, December 2001. 
19  "Openness, imperfect exchange rate pass-through and monetary policy" by F. Smets and 
R. Wouters, Research series, March 2002. 
20.  "Inflation, relative prices and nominal rigidities" by L. Aucremanne, G. Brys, M. Hubert, 
P. J. Rousseeuw and A. Struyf, Research series, April 2002. 
21.  "Lifting the burden: fundamental tax reform and economic growth" by D. Jorgenson, Research 
series, May 2002.  53 
22.  "What do we know about investment under uncertainty?" by L. Trigeorgis,  Research series, 
May 2002. 
23.  "Investment, uncertainty and irreversibility: evidence from Belgian accounting data" by 
D. Cassimon, P.-J. Engelen, H. Meersman, M. Van Wouwe, Research series, May 2002. 
24.  "The impact of uncertainty on investment plans" by P. Butzen, C. Fuss, Ph. Vermeulen, Research 
series, May 2002. 
25.  "Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital" by Ch. P. Himmelberg, 
R. G. Hubbard, I. Love, Research series, May 2002. 
26.  "Finance, uncertainty and investment: assessing the gains and losses of a generalised non-linear 
structural approach using Belgian panel data", by M. Gérard, F. Verschueren, Research series, 
May 2002. 
27.  "Capital structure, firm liquidity and growth" by R. Anderson, Research series, May 2002. 
28.  "Structural modelling of investment and financial constraints: where do we stand?" by 
J.- B. Chatelain, Research series, May 2002. 
29.  "Financing and investment interdependencies in unquoted Belgian companies: the role of venture 
capital" by S. Manigart, K. Baeyens, I. Verschueren, Research series, May 2002. 
30.  "Development path and capital structure of Belgian biotechnology firms" by V. Bastin, A. Corhay, 
G. Hübner, P.-A. Michel, Research series, May 2002. 
31.  "Governance as a source of managerial discipline" by J. Franks, Research series, May 2002. 
32.  "Financing constraints, fixed capital and R&D investment decisions of Belgian firms" by 
M. Cincera, Research series, May 2002. 
33.  "Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints: a corporate governance approach to the Belgian 
evidence" by P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2002. 
34.  "On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies" by I. Maes,  Research series, 
July 2002. 
35.  "An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Euro Area", by F. Smets and 
R. Wouters, Research series, October 2002. 
36.  "The labour market and fiscal impact of labour tax reductions: The case of reduction of 
employers' social security contributions under a wage norm regime with automatic price indexing 
of wages", by K. Burggraeve and Ph. Du Caju, Research series, March 2003. 
37.  "Scope of asymmetries in the Euro Area", by S. Ide and Ph. Moës,  Document series, 
March 2003. 
38.  "De autonijverheid in België: Het belang van het toeleveringsnetwerk rond de assemblage van 
personenauto's", by F. Coppens and G. van Gastel, Document series, June 2003. 
39.  "La consommation privée en Belgique", by B. Eugène, Ph. Jeanfils and B. Robert, Document 
series, June 2003. 
40.  "The process of European monetary integration: a comparison of the Belgian and Italian 
approaches", by I. Maes and L. Quaglia, Research series, August 2003. 
41.  "Stock market valuation in the United States", by P. Bisciari, A. Durré and A. Nyssens, Document 
series, November 2003.  54 
42.  "Modeling the Term Structure of Interest Rates: Where Do We Stand?", by K. Maes, Research 
series, February 2004. 
43.  "Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Systemic Risk in the Belgian Banking 
System", by H. Degryse and G. Nguyen, Research series, March 2004.  
44.  "How Frequently do Prices change? Evidence Based on the Micro Data Underlying the Belgian 
CPI", by L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, Research series, April 2004. 
45.  "Firm's investment decisions in reponse to demand and price uncertainty", by C. Fuss and 
Ph. Vermeulen, Research series, April 2004. 
46.  "SMEs and Bank Lending Relationships: the Impact of Mergers", by H. Degryse, N. Masschelein 
and J. Mitchell, Research series, May 2004. 
47.  "The Determinants of Pass-Through of Market Conditions to Bank Retail Interest Rates in 
Belgium", by F. De Graeve, O. De Jonghe and R. Vander Vennet, Research series, May 2004. 
48.  "Sectoral vs. country diversification benefits and downside risk", by M. Emiris, Research series, 
May 2004. 
49.  "How does liquidity react to stress periods in a limit order market?", by H. Beltran, A. Durré and 
P. Giot, Research series, May 2004. 
50.  "Financial consolidation and liquidity: p rudential regulation and/or competition policy?", by 
P. Van Cayseele, Research series, May 2004. 
51.  "Basel II and Operational Risk: Implications for risk measurement and management in the 
financial sector", by A. Chapelle, Y. Crama, G. Hübner and J.-P. Peters,  Research series, 
May 2004. 
 
 
 